Denoised Smoothing: A Provable Defense for Pretrained Classifiers by Salman, Hadi et al.
Black-box Smoothing: A Provable Defense for Pretrained Classifiers
Hadi Salman 1 Mingjie Sun 2 Greg Yang 1 Ashish Kapoor 1 J. Zico Kolter 2
Abstract
We present a method for provably defending any
pretrained image classifier against `p adversarial
attacks. By prepending a custom-trained denoiser
to any off-the-shelf image classifier and using
randomized smoothing, we effectively create a
new classifier that is guaranteed to be `p-robust
to adversarial examples, without modifying the
pretrained classifier. The approach applies both
to the case where we have full access to the pre-
trained classifier as well as the case where we
only have query access. We refer to this defense
as black-box smoothing, and we demonstrate its
effectiveness through extensive experimentation
on ImageNet and CIFAR-10. Finally, we use our
method to provably defend the Azure, Google,
AWS, and ClarifAI image classification APIs.
Our code replicating all the experiments in the pa-
per can be found at: https://github.com/
microsoft/blackbox-smoothing.
1. Introduction
Image classification using deep learning, despite its recent
success, is well-known to be susceptible to adversarial at-
tacks: small, imperceptible perturbations of the inputs that
drastically change the resulting predictions (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b).
To solve this problem, many works proposed heuristic de-
fenses that build models robust to adversarial perturbations,
though many of these defenses were broken using more pow-
erful adversaries (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Athalye et al.,
2018; Uesato et al., 2018). This has led researchers to both
strengthen empirical defenses (Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry
et al., 2017) as well as to develop certified defenses that
come with robustness guarantees, i.e., classifiers whose pre-
dictions are constant within a neighborhood of their inputs
(Wong & Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018a; Cohen
et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019a). However, the majority
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of these defenses require that the classifier be trained (from
scratch) specifically to optimize the robust performance cri-
terion, making the process of building robust classifiers a
computationally expensive one.
In this paper, we consider the problem of generating a ro-
bust classifier without retraining the underlying model at
all. There are several use cases for such an approach. For
example, a provider of a large-scale image classification
API may want to offer a “robust” version of the API, but
may not want to maintain and/or continually retrain two
models that need to be evaluated and validated separately.
Even more realistically, a user of a public vision API might
want to use that API to create robust predictions (presum-
ing that the API performs well on clean data), but may not
have access to the underlying non-robust model. In both
cases (which exemplify the full-access and query-access
settings respectively), it would be highly desirable if one
could simply apply an off-the-shelf “filter” that would allow
practitioners to automatically generate a provably robust
model from this standard model.
We propose a new approach to obtain a provably robust
classifier from a fixed pretrained one, without any additional
training or fine-tuning of the latter. This approach is de-
picted in Figure 1. The basic idea, which we call black-box
smoothing1, is to prepend a custom-trained denoiser before
the pretrained classifier, and then apply randomized smooth-
ing (Cohen et al., 2019). Randomized smoothing is a certi-
fied defense that converts any given classifier f into a new
smoothed classifier g that is characterized with a non-linear
Lipschitz property (Salman et al., 2019a). When queried at
a point x, the smoothed classifier g outputs the class that
is most likely to be returned by f under isotropic Gaussian
perturbations of its inputs. Randomized smoothing requires
that the underlying classifier f is robust to relatively large
random Gaussian perturbations of the input, which is not
the case for off-the-shelf pretrained models. By applying
our custom-trained denoiser to the classifier f , we can effec-
tively make f robust to such Gaussian perturbations, thereby
making it “suitable” for randomized smoothing.
Key to our approach is how we train our denoisers, which
1We adopt this name since, although the pretrained classifier we
are defending does not necessarily need to be “black-box” (i.e. can
be full-access but fixed), the classifier is oblivious to the smoothing
that is going on.
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Figure 1. Given a clean image x, our black-box smoothing procedure creates a smoothed classifier by appending a denoiser to any
pretrained classifier (e.g. online commercial APIs) so that the pipeline predicts in majority the correct class under Gaussian noise
corrupted-copies of x. The resultant classifier is certifiably robust against `2-perturbations of its input.
Table 1. Certified top-1 accuracy of ResNet-50 on ImageNet at various `2 radii (Standard accuracy is in parenthesis).
`2 RADIUS (IMAGENET) 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5
WHITE-BOX SMOOTHING (COHEN ET AL., 2019) (%) (70)62 (70)52 (62)45 (62)39 (62)34 (50)29
NO DENOISER (BASELINE) (%) (49)32 (12)4 (12)2 (0)0 (0)0 (0)0
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (QUERY ACCESS) (%) (69)48 (56)31 (56)19 (34)12 (34)7 (30)4
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (FULL ACCESS) (%) (67)50 (60)33 (60)20 (38)14 (38)11 (38)6
Table 2. Certified accuracy of ResNet-110 on CIFAR-10 at various `2 radii (Standard accuracy is in parenthesis).
`2 RADIUS (CIFAR-10) 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5
WHITE-BOX SMOOTHING (COHEN ET AL., 2019) (%) (77)59 (77)45 (65)31 (65)21 (45)18 (45)13
NO DENOISER (BASELINE) (%) (10)7 (9)3 (9)0 (16)0 (16)0 (16)0
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (QUERY ACCESS) (%) (81)45 (68)20 (21)15 (21)13 (16)11 (16)10
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (FULL ACCESS) (%) (72)56 (62)41 (62)28 (44)19 (42)16 (44)13
is not merely to reconstruct the original image, but also to
maintain its original label predicted by f . Similar heuristics
have been used before; indeed, some of the original adver-
sarial defenses involved applying input transformations to
“remove” adversarial perturbations (Guo et al., 2017; Liao
et al., 2018; Prakash et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2018), but these
defenses were soon broken by more sophisticated attacks
(Athalye et al., 2018; Athalye & Carlini, 2018; Carlini &
Wagner, 2017a). In contrast, the approach we present here
exploits the certified nature of randomized smoothing to
ensure that our defense is provably secure.
Our contribution is demonstrating for the first time, to
the best of our knowledge, a simple yet effective method
for converting any pretrained classifier into a provably ro-
bust one. This applies both to the setting where we have
full access to the classifier, and to the setting where we
only have query access to the classifier. We verify the ef-
ficacy of our method through extensive experimentation
on ImageNet and CIFAR-10. We are able to convert pre-
trained ResNet-18/34/50 and ResNet-110, on CIFAR-10
and ImageNet respectively, into certifiably robust models;
Our results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 (details are
in section 4)2. For instance, we are able to boost the certi-
fied accuracy of an ImageNet-pretrained ResNet-50 from
2Tables for ResNet-18/34 on ImageNet are in Appendix B.
4% to: 31% for the query-access setting, and 33% for the
full-access setting, under adversarial perturbations with `2
norm less than 127/255. We also show the effectiveness of
our method through real-world experiments on the Azure,
Google, AWS, and ClarifAI image classification APIs. We
are able to wrap these vision APIs with our method, leading
to provably robust versions of these APIs despite having
only query access to them.
2. Related Work
In the past few years, numerous defenses have been pro-
posed to build adversarially robust classifiers. In this paper,
we distinguish between robust training based defenses and
input transformation based defenses. Although we use ran-
domized smoothing, our defense largely fits into the latter
category, as it is based upon a denoiser applied before the
pretrained classifier.
2.1. Robust Training Based Defenses
Many defenses train a robust classifier via a robust training
procedure, i.e., the classifier is trained, usually from scratch,
specifically to optimize a robust performance criterion. We
characterize two directions of robust training based defenses:
empirical defenses and certified defenses.
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Empirical defenses are those which have been empirically
shown to be robust to existing adversarial attacks. The best
empirical defense to date is adversarial training (Kurakin
et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2017), in which a robust classifier
is learned by training directly on adversarial examples. Al-
though such defenses have been shown to be strong, nothing
guarantees that a stronger, not-yet-known, attack would not
“break” them. In fact, most empirical defenses proposed in
the literature were later broken by stronger adversaries (Car-
lini & Wagner, 2017a; Athalye et al., 2018; Uesato et al.,
2018; Athalye & Carlini, 2018). To put an end to this arms
race, a few works tried to build certified defenses that come
with formal robustness guarantees.
Certified defenses provide guarantees that for any input x,
the classifier’s prediction is constant within a neighborhood
of x. The majority of the training-based certified defenses
rely on minimizing an upper bound of a loss function over
all adversarial perturbations (Wong & Kolter, 2018; Wang
et al., 2018a;b; Raghunathan et al., 2018a;b; Wong et al.,
2018; Dvijotham et al., 2018b;a; Croce et al., 2018; Salman
et al., 2019b; Gehr et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2018; Singh
et al., 2018; Gowal et al., 2018; Weng et al., 2018; Zhang
et al., 2018a). However, these defenses are, in general,
not scalable to large models (e.g. ResNet-50) and datasets
(e.g. ImageNet). More recently, a more scalable approach
called randomized smoothing was proposed as a probabilis-
tically certified defense. Randomized smoothing converts
any given classifier into another provably robust classifier
by convolving the former with an isotropic Gaussian distri-
bution. It was proposed by several works (Liu et al., 2018;
Cao & Gong, 2017) as a heuristic defense without proving
any guarantees. A few works afterwards were able to pro-
vide formal guarantees for randomized smoothing (Lecuyer
et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019).
Although, in theory, randomized smoothing does not re-
quire any training of the original classifier, in order to get
non-trivial robustness results, the original classifier has to
be custom-trained from scratch as shown in several papers
(Lecuyer et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al.,
2019a; Zhai et al., 2020). Lecuyer et al. (2018) experi-
mented with stacking denoising autoencoders before deep
neural networks (DNNs) to scale PixelDP to practical DNNs
that are tedious to train from scratch. However, there are
two key differences between this work and ours: 1) Lecuyer
et al. (2018) trained the denoising autoencoder with only the
reconstruction loss, as opposed to the classification-based
stability loss that we discuss shortly; and 2) this past work
further fine-tuned the classifier itself, whereas the central
motivation of our paper is to avoid this step. Indeed, the de-
noising autoencoder in this prior work was largely intended
as a heuristic to speed up training, and differs quite substan-
tially from our application to certify pretrained classifiers.
2.2. Input Transformation Based Defenses
These defenses try to remove the adversarial perturbations
from the input by transforming the input before feeding it
to the classifier. Many such defenses have been proposed
(but later broken) in previous works(Guo et al., 2017; Meng
& Chen, 2017; Xu et al., 2018; Liao et al., 2018). Guo
et al. (2017) proposed to use traditional image processing,
e.g. image cropping, rescaling, and quilting. Meng & Chen
(2017) trained an autoencoder to reconstruct clean images.
Xu et al. (2018) used color bit depth reduction and spatial
smoothing to reduce the space of adversarial attacks. Liao
et al. (2018) trained a classification-guided denoiser to re-
move adversarial noise. However, all these defenses were
broken by stronger attacks (Warren et al., 2017; Carlini &
Wagner, 2017a; Athalye et al., 2018; Athalye & Carlini,
2018). To the best of our knowledge, all existing input
transformation based defenses are empirical defenses. In
this work, we present the first input transformation based
defense that provides provable guarantees.
2.3. Defending Against General `p Threat Models
Throughout the paper, we focus on defending against `2 ad-
versarial perturbations, although nothing in theory prevents
our method from being applied to other `p threat models.
In fact, as long as randomized smoothing works for other
`p norms (which has been shown in recent papers (Li et al.,
2019; Lee et al., 2019; Dvijotham et al., 2020)), our method
automatically works. The only change would be the way our
denoisers are trained; instead of training via Gaussian noise
augmentation, the denoisers shall be trained on data cor-
rupted with noise that is sampled from other distributions
(e.g. Laplace distribution for `1 threat models (Li et al.,
2019)).
3. Black-box Smoothing
In this section, we describe our proposed defense, black-
box smoothing, for provably defending pretrained classifiers.
This contrasts with the common setting of directly training
the classifier to optimize the performance of randomized
smoothing, which we refer to within this paper using the
term white-box smoothing. We first introduce some back-
ground on randomized smoothing. We refer the reader to
Cohen et al. (2019) and Salman et al. (2019a) for a more
detailed description of this technique.
3.1. Background on Randomized Smoothing
Given a classifier f mapping inputs in Rd to classes in
Y , the randomized smoothing procedure converts the base
classifier f into a new, smoothed classifier g. Specifically,
for input x, g returns the class that is most likely to be
returned by the base classifier f under isotropic Gaussian
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noise perturbations of x, i.e.,
g(x) = arg max
c∈Y
P[f(x+ δ) = c] (1)
where δ ∼ N (0, σ2I) .
where the noise level σ controls the tradeoff between ro-
bustness and accuracy. Cohen et al. (2019) presented a tight
robustness guarantee for the smoothed classifier g and gave
an efficient algorithm based on Monte Carlo sampling for
the prediction and certification of g.
Robustness guarantee for smoothed classifiers The ro-
bustness guarantee of the smoothed classifier is based on
the Neyman-Pearson lemma (Cohen et al., 2019)3. The pro-
cedure is as follows: suppose that when the base classifier f
classifies N (x, σ2I), the class cA is returned with probabil-
ity pA = P(f(x+δ) = cA), and the “runner-up” class cB is
returned with probability pB = maxc6=cA P(f(x+ δ) = c).
The smoothed classifier g is robust around x within the
radius
R =
σ
2
(
Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)
)
, (2)
where Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard Gaussian CDF.
When f is a deep neural network, computing pA and pB
accurately is not practical. To mitigate this problem, Cohen
et al. (2019) used Monte Carlo sampling to estimate some
pA and pB such that pA ≤ pA and pB ≥ pB with arbitrarily
high probability. The certified radius is then computed by
replacing pA, pB with pA, pB in Equation 2.
3.2. Black-box Smoothing via Image Denoising
Randomized smoothing gives a framework for certifying
a classifier f without any restrictions on the classifier it-
self. However, naively applying randomized smoothing on
a standard-trained classifier gives very loose certification
bounds (as verified by our experiments in section 4). This
is because standard classifiers, in general, are not trained
to be robust to Gaussian perturbations of their inputs. To
solve this problem, previous works on randomized smooth-
ing use Gaussian noise augmentation (Cohen et al., 2019)
and adversarial training (Salman et al., 2019a) to train the
underlying classifier.
We propose a general method called black-box smoothing,
where the goal is to certify existing pretrained classifiers
using randomized smoothing without modifying those clas-
sifiers. We identify two common scenarios for using black-
box smoothing: 1) we have complete knowledge and full ac-
cess to the pretrained classifiers (e.g. API service providers).
In this setting, we can back-propagate gradients efficiently
through the pretrained classifiers; 2) we only have query
access to the pretrained classifiers (e.g. API users).
3 This guarantee can also be obtained alternatively by explicitly
computing the Lipschitz constant of the smoothed classifier as
shown in Salman et al. (2019a).
Our method avoids training the base classifier f using Gaus-
sian noise augmentation, but instead, uses an image denois-
ing pre-processing step before passing inputs through f . In
our setting, denoising is aimed at removing the Gaussian
noise used in randomized smoothing. More concretely, we
do this by augmenting the classifier f with a custom-trained
denoiser Dθ : Rd −→ Rd. Thus, our new base classifier is
defined as f ◦ Dθ : Rd −→ Y .
Assuming the denoiser Dθ is effective at removing Gaus-
sian noise, our framework is characterized to classify well
under Gaussian perturbation of its inputs. Our black-box
smoothing procedure, illustrated in Figure 1, is then for-
mally defined as taking the majority vote using this new
base classifier f ◦ Dθ:
g(x) = arg max
c∈Y
P[f(Dθ(x+ δ)) = c] (3)
where δ ∼ N (0, σ2I) .
Our defense can be seen as a form of image processing,
where we perform input transformations before before clas-
sifying. As opposed to previous works that also used image
denoising as an empirical defense (Gu & Rigazio, 2014;
Liao et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2019; Gupta & Rahtu, 2019),
our method gives provable robustness guarantees. Our de-
noisers are not intended to remove the adversarial noise,
which could lie in some obscure high-dimensional sub-
space (Tramr et al., 2017) and is computationally hard to
find (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b). Our denoisers are only
needed to “remove” the Gaussian noise used in randomized
smoothing. In short, we effectively transform the problem
of adversarial defense to the problem of Gaussian denois-
ing; the better the denoising performance, in terms of the
custom objectives we will mention shortly, the more robust
the resulting smoothed classifier.
3.3. Training the Denoiser Dθ
The effectiveness of black-box smoothing highly depends
on the denoisers we use. For each noise level σ, we train a
separate denoiser. The noise level σ allows users to choose
the desired robustness/accuracy trade-off; as σ increases,
the robustness of the resultant classifier increases while its
standard accuracy decreases. In this work, we explore two
different objectives for training the denoiser Dθ: 1) the
mean squared error objective (MSE), and 2) the stability
objective (STAB).
MSE objective: this is the most commonly used objective
in image denoising. Given an (unlabeled) dataset S = {xi}
of clean images, a denoiser is trained by minimizing the
reconstruction objective, i.e., the MSE between the original
image xi and the output of the denoiser Dθ(xi + δ), where
δ ∼ N (0, σ2I). Formally, the loss is defined as follows,
LMSE = ES,δ ‖Dθ(xi + δ)− xi‖
2
2 (4)
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This objective allows for training Dθ in an unsupervised
fashion. In this work, we focus on the additive white Gaus-
sian noise denoising, which is one of the most studied dis-
criminative denoising models (Zhang et al., 2017; 2018b).
Stability objective: the MSE objective turns out not to be
the best way to train denoisers for our goal. We desire
the pretrained classifier to be effective at recognizing the
denoised images. However, the MSE objective does not
actually optimize for this goal. Thus, we explore another
objective that explicitly considers classification under Gaus-
sian noise. Specifically, given a dataset S = {(xi, yi)}, we
train a denoiser Dθ from scratch with the goal of classifying
images corrupted with Gaussian noise:
LStab = ES,δ `CE(F (Dθ(xi + δ)), f(xi)) (5)
where δ ∼ N (0, σ2I) ,
where F (x), that outputs probabilities over the classes, is
the soft version of the hard classifier f(x) (i.e., f(x) =
arg maxc∈Y F (x)), and `CE is the cross entropy loss. We
call this new objective the stability objective4, and we refer
to it as STAB in what follows5. This objective can be applied
both in the full-access and the query-access settings of the
pretrained classifier:
• Full-access pretrained classifiers: since we have full
access to the pretrained classifier in hand, we can back-
propagate gradients through the classifier to optimize
the denoisers using STAB. In other words, we train
denoisers from scratch to minimize the classification
error using the pseudo-labels given by the pretrained
classifier.
• Query-access pretrained classifiers: since we only
have query access to these classifiers, it is difficult
to use their gradient information. We get around this
problem by using (pretrained) surrogate classifiers6
as proxies for the actual classifiers we are defending.
More specifically, we train the denoisers to minimize
the stability loss of the surrogate classifiers. It turns out
that training denoisers in such a fashion can transfer to
unseen classifiers.
We would like to stress that when using the stability ob-
jective, the underlying classifier is fixed. In this case, the
classifier can be seen as providing high-level guidance for
training the denoiser.
Combining the MSE and Stability Objectives: We ex-
plore a hybrid training scheme which connects the low-level
4Note that the stability objective used here is similar in spirit to,
but different in context from, the stability training used in Zheng
et al. (2016); Li et al. (2019)
5We also experiment with the classification objective which
uses the true label yi instead of f(xi). Details are shown in
Appendix E.
6For ImageNet, we experiment with standard-trained ResNet-
18/34/50 as surrogate models. For CIFAR-10, we experiment with
14 standard-trained models listed in Appendix A.
Table 3. The objectives used in our experiments. Here, “STAB +
MSE” means fine-tuning MSE-denoisers with the stability objec-
tive. 3: Conducted experiment, 7: Potential experiment that is not
conducted due to computational constraints.
CLASSIFIER’S DENOISER’S OBJECTIVE
ACCESS TYPE MSE STAB + MSE STAB
CIFAR-10 FULL 3 3 3QUERY 3 3 3
IMAGENET FULL 3 3 7QUERY 3 3 7
VISION-APIS QUERY 3 3 7
image denoising task to high-level image classification. In-
spired by the “pretraining+fine-tuning” paradigm in ma-
chine learning, denoisers trained with MSE can be good
initializations for training with STAB. Therefore, we com-
bine these two objectives by fine-tuning the MSE-denoisers
using STAB. We refer to this as STAB+MSE.
In this work, we experiment with all the above mentioned
ways of training Dθ. A complete overview of the objectives
used for different access types and classifiers is given in Ta-
ble 3. Note that we experiment with MSE and STAB+MSE
for all the classifiers, but we do STAB-training from scratch
only on CIFAR-10 due to computational constraints.
BETTER BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING
4. Experiments
In this section, we present our experiments to robustify pre-
trained ImageNet and CIFAR-10 classifiers. We use two
recent denoisers: DnCNN (Zhang et al., 2017) and Mem-
Net (Tai et al., 2017)7. For all experiments, we compare
with two baselines: 1) certifying pretrained classifiers with-
out stacking any denoisers before them (denoted as “No
denoiser”), and 2) certifying classifiers trained via Gaussian
noise augmentation (Cohen et al., 2019), i.e., white-box
smoothing (denoted as “White-box”).
For a given (classifier f , denoiser Dθ) pair, the certified
radii of the data points in a given test set are calculated
using Equation 2 with f ◦ Dθ as the base classifier. The
certification curves are then plotted by calculating the per-
centage of the data points whose radii are larger than a given
`2-radius. In the following experiments, we only report
the results for σ = 0.25,8 and we report the best curves
over the denoiser architectures mentioned above. For the
complete results using other values of σ, we refer the reader
to Appendix B. The compute resources and training time
7We also experiment with DnCNN-wide, a wide version of
DnCNN which we define (more details in Appendix A). Note that
we do not claim these are the best denoisers in the literature. We
just picked two common denoisers. A better choice of denoiser
might lead to improvements in our results.
8We use the same σ for training the denoiser and for certifying
the corresponding denoised classifier via Equation 2.
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Figure 2. Certifying a ResNet-110 CIFAR-10 classifier with (a) full-access and (b)(c) query-access using various denoisers. σ = 0.25.
Table 4. Average training statistics for our denoisers. We run our experiments on NVIDIA P100 and V100 GPUs. The “+” sign refers to
the additional epochs/time incurred over the MSE baseline.
TRAINED DENOISER OBJECTIVE COMPUTE #EPOCHS SEC/EPOCH TOTAL TIME (HR)
CIFAR-10/DNCNN
MSE 1×P100 90 31 0.78
STAB+MSE RESNET-110 1×P100 +20 57 +0.32
STAB RESNET-110 1×P100 600 59 9.80
CIFAR-10/DNCNN-WIDE
MSE 1×P100 90 122 3.05
STAB+MSE RESNET-110 1×P100 +20 135 +0.75
STAB RESNET-110 1×P100 600 156 26.00
CIFAR-10/MEMNET
MSE 1×P100 90 85 2.13
STAB+MSE RESNET-110 1×P100 +20 118 +0.66
STAB RESNET-110 1×P100 600 125 20.83
IMAGENET/DNCNN
MSE 4×V100 5 6320 8.78
STAB+MSE RESNET-18 4×V100 +20 6500 +36.11
STAB+MSE RESNET-34 4×V100 +20 6900 +38.33
STAB+MSE RESNET-50 4×V100 +20 7620 +42.33
VISION-APIS/DNCNN SAME AS IMAGENET SAME AS IMAGENET
for our experiments are shown in Table 4. Note that we can
train denoisers on different datasets in reasonable time. For
more details on the architectures of the classifiers/denoisers,
training/certification hyperparameters/procedure, etc., we
refer the reader to Appendix A.
4.1. Certifying Full-Access Pretrained Classifiers
In this experiment, we assume that the classifier to be de-
fended is known and accessible by the defender, but the
defender is not allowed to train or fine-tune this classifier.
For CIFAR-10, this classifier is a pretrained ResNet-110
model. The results are shown in Figure 2a. Attaching a
denoiser trained on the stability objective (STAB) leads to
better certified accuracies than attaching a denoiser trained
on the MSE objective or only finetuned on the stability
objective (STAB+MSE). All of these substantially surpass
the “No denoiser” baseline; we achieve an improvement of
49% in certified accuracy (over the “No denoiser” baseline)
against adversarial perturbations with `2 norm less than
64/255 (see Table 2 for more results).
Additionally, Figure 2a plots the certified accuracies of
a ResNet-110 classifier trained using Gaussian data aug-
mentation (Cohen et al., 2019), represented by the “White-
box” curve. Although our method does not modify the
underlying standard-trained ResNet-110 model, our STAB-
denoiser achieves similar certified accuracies as the white-
box smoothing model.
For ImageNet, we apply our method to PyTorch-pretrained
ResNet-18/34/50 classifiers. We assume that we have full
access to these pretrained models. The results are shown in
Figure 3. STAB+MSE performs better than MSE, and again,
both of these substantially improve over the “No denoiser”
baseline; we achieve an improvement of 29% in certified ac-
curacy (over the “No denoiser” baseline) against adversarial
perturbations with `2 norm less than 127/255 (see Table 1
for more results). Note that we do not experiment with STAB
denoisers on ImageNet as it is computationally expensive to
train those denoisers, instead we save time by fine-tuning a
MSE-denoiser on the stability objective (STAB+MSE)9.
4.2. Certifying Query-Access Pretrained Classifiers
In this experiment, we assume that the classifier to be de-
fended only allows query access.
For CIFAR-10, this classifier is a pretrained ResNet-110
model. The results are shown in Figure 2b. Similar to the
full-access setting, STAB leads to better certified accuracies
than both STAB-MSE and MSE. Note that in this setting,
STAB and STAB-MSE are both trained with 14 surrogate
9See Table 4 for details on the computation time and resources.
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Figure 3. Certifying ResNet-18/34/50 ImageNet classifiers with full-access using various denoisers. σ = 0.25.
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Figure 4. Certifying ResNet-18/34/50 ImageNet classifiers with query-access using various denoisers. σ = 0.25. Note how fine-tuning
the denoisers by attaching surrogate classifiers maintains the high certification accuracy as the full-access setting.
models (in order to transfer to the query-access ResNet-110).
See Appendix A for details of these surrogate models.
It turns out that for STAB-MSE, only one surrogate CIFAR-
10 classifier (namely Wide-ResNet) is also sufficient for
the denoiser to transfer well to ResNet-110 as shown in
Figure 2c, whereas for STAB, more surrogate models are
needed. A detailed analysis of the effect of the num-
ber of surrogate models on the performance of STAB and
STAB+MSE is deferred to Appendix C.
Overall, we achieve an improvement of 38% in certified ac-
curacy (over the “No denoiser” baseline) against adversarial
perturbations with `2 norm less than 64/255. It turns out the
certified accuracies obtained for query-access ResNet-110
are lower than those obtained for full-access ResNet-110
(see Figure 2 and Table 2), which is expected as we have
less information in the query-access setting.
For ImageNet, we again consider PyTorch-pretrained
ResNet-18/34/50 classifiers, but now we treat them as
“black-box” models. The results are shown in Figure 4,
and are similar to the CIFAR-10 results, i.e., attaching a
STAB+MSE-denoiser trained on surrogate models leads to
a more robust model than attaching a MSE-denoiser. Note
that here for STAB+MSE, we fine-tune a MSE-denoiser on
the stability objective using only one surrogate model due
to computational constraints, and also because, as observed
on CIFAR-10, the performance of STAB+MSE is similar
whether only 1 or 14 surrogate models are used. The exact
surrogate models used are shown in Figure 4. For exam-
(a) Noisy (b) MSE (c) Stab+MSE
Figure 5. Different denoising performance for different denois-
ers (noise level σ = 1.00). Note that, although the Stab+MSE
denoiser (trained on ResNet-18) leads to strange artifacts as com-
pared to the MSE-denoiser, it gives better certification results as
shown in Figure 3.
ple, in Figure 4c, the black-box model to be defended is
ResNet-50, so ResNet-18/34 are used as surrogate models.
Note that using either model to fine-tune the denoiser leads
to roughly the same certified accuracies. We achieve an
improvement of 27% in certified accuracy (over the “No
denoiser” baseline) against adversarial perturbations with
`2 norm less than 127/255 (see Table 1 for more results).
4.3. Perceptual Performance of Denoisers
We note that although the certification results of stability
trained denoisers (STAB and STAB+MSE) are better than
the MSE-trained ones, the actual denoising performance
of the former does not seem to be as good as the latter.
Figure 5 shows an example of denoising a noisy image of
an elephant (noise level σ = 1.0). The reconstructed image
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(b) Google Cloud Vision API
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Figure 6. Results for certifying four APIs using 100 noise samples per image, σ = 0.25. “STAB+MSE best” corresponds to the best
denoiser out of three denoisers trained via STAB+MSE with three different ImageNet surrogate models: ResNet-18/34/50.
using stability-trained denoisers has some strange artifacts.
For more examples, see Appendix F.
5. Defending Public Vision APIs
We demonstrate that our approach can provide certification
guarantees for commercial classifiers. We consider four
public vision APIs: Azure Computer Vision API10, Google
Cloud Vision API11, AWS Rekognition API12, and Clarifai
API13, the models of which are not revealed to the public.
Previous works have demonstrated that the Google Cloud
Vision API is vulnerable to adversarial attacks (Ilyas et al.,
2018; Guo et al., 2019). In this work, we demonstrate for the
first time, to the best of our knowledge, a certifiable defense
for online APIs. Our approach is general and applicable
to any API with no knowledge whatsoever of the API’s
underlying model. Our defense only requires query-access
to these APIs.
We focus on the classification service of each API.14 Given
an input image, each API returns a sorted list of related
labels ranked by the corresponding confidence scores. The
simplest way to build a classifier from the information is
to define the classifier’s output as the label with the highest
confidence score among the list of labels returned.15 In this
work, we adopt this simple strategy of obtaining a classifier
from these APIs.
To assess the performance of our method on these APIs, we
aggregate 100 random images from the ImageNet validation
set and certify their predictions across all four APIs. We
use 100 Monte-Carlo samples per data point to estimate
the certified radius using Equation 2. We experiment with
σ = 0.25 and with two types of denoisers: an MSE-DnCNN
trained on the full ImageNet, and a STAB+MSE DnCNN
trained with ResNet-18/34/50 as surrogate models. We also
10https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/
cognitive-services/computer-vision/
11https://cloud.google.com/vision/
12https://aws.amazon.com/rekognition/
13https://www.clarifai.com/
14For Azure Vision API, this is the image tagging service.
15For AWS, there can be multiple top labels with equivalent
scores. We select the first one in the list as the classifier’s output.
compare to the “No denoiser” baseline, which refers to
applying randomized smoothing directly on the APIs.
Figure 6 shows the certified accuracies for all the APIs
using both STAB+MSE and MSE. Both denoisers outper-
form the baseline. Note how the certification results are in
general best for stability-trained denoisers, although these
were trained on surrogate models, and had no access to
underlying models of the vision APIs. For details of the
surrogate models used and for more results on these APIs,
see Appendix D.
We believe this is only a first step towards certifying public
machine learning APIs. Here we restrict ourselves to 100
noisy samples due to budget considerations, however, one
can always obtain a larger certified radius by querying more
noisy samples (e.g. 1k or 10k) (as verified in Appendix D).
Our results also suggest the possibility for machine learning
service providers to offer robust versions of their APIs with-
out having to change their pretrained classifiers. This can
be done by simply wrapping their APIs with our custom-
trained denoisers.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a simple defense called black-box
smoothing that can convert existing pretrained classifiers
into provably robust ones without any retraining or fine-
tuning. We achieve this by prepending a custom-trained de-
noiser to these pretrained classifers. We experimented with
different strategies for training the denoiser and obtained
significant boost over the trivial application of randomized
smoothing on pretrained classifiers. We are the first, to the
best of our knowledge, to show that we can provably defend
online vision APIs.
There is still plenty of room for improving our method. For
example, training denoisers that can get as good certified
accuracies as white-box smoothing is still not fully achieved
in our paper. We are able to achieve almost as good results
as white-box smoothing in the full-access setting, but not
in the query-access setting as shown in Figures 2b and 4.
Finding methods that can train denoisers to close the gap
between black-box smoothing and white-box smoothing
remains a valuable future direction.
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A. Experiments Details
In this appendix, we include details of all the experiments conducted in our paper.
A.1. Denoiser Models
The denoisers used in this paper are:
1. DnCNN (Zhang et al., 2017) https://github.com/cszn/DnCNN/tree/master/TrainingCodes/
dncnn_pytorch.
2. DnCNN-Wide: a wide version of the DnCNN architecture; specifically convolutional layers with a width of 128 instead
of 64. Check the code for more details.
3. MemNet (Tai et al., 2017) https://github.com/tyshiwo/MemNet.
We run experiments with all of these denoisers on CIFAR-10. For ImageNet , we stick to DnCNN only due to GPU memory
constraints. Note that we do not claim these are the best denoisers in the literature. We just picked these common denoisers.
A better choice of denoisers might lead to improvements in our results.
Training details Here we include the training details of each denoiser used in our paper. The results in the paper are
reported for the best denoisers over all the hyperparameters (architectures, optimizer, and learning rate) summarized in the
following table. Also, for each architecture, the reported training time of each model is averaged over all the instances of
training this architecture with various optimizers and learning rates.
Table 5. Average training statistics for our denoisers. We run our experiments on NVIDIA P100 and V100 GPUs. For STAB+MSE, the “+”
sign refers to the additional epochs/total time incurred over the MSE baseline since STAB+MSE is basically fine-tuning MSE denoisers.
TRAINED DENOISER OBJECTIVE COMPUTE #EPOCHS OPTIMIZER LEARNING RATE SEC/EPOCH TOTAL TIME (HR)
CIFAR-10/DNCNN
MSE 1×P100 90 ADAM 1e− 3 31 0.78
STAB+MSE RESNET-110 1×P100 +20 {ADAM, SGD} {1e− 4, 1e− 5} 57 +0.32
STAB RESNET-110 1×P100 600 ADAMTHENSGD SEE BELOW 59 9.80
CIFAR-10/DNCNN-WIDE
MSE 1×P100 90 ADAM 1e− 3 122 3.05
STAB+MSE RESNET-110 1×P100 +20 {ADAM, SGD} {1e− 4, 1e− 5} 135 +0.75
STAB RESNET-110 1×P100 600 ADAMTHENSGD SEE BELOW 156 26.00
CIFAR-10/MEMNET
MSE 1×P100 90 ADAM 1e− 3 85 2.13
STAB+MSE RESNET-110 1×P100 +20 {ADAM, SGD} {1e− 4, 1e− 5} 118 +0.66
STAB RESNET-110 1×P100 600 ADAMTHENSGD SEE BELOW 125 20.83
IMAGENET/DNCNN
MSE 4×V100 5 ADAM 1e− 4 6320 8.78
STAB+MSE RESNET-18 4×V100 +20 ADAM 1e− 5 6500 +36.11
STAB+MSE RESNET-34 4×V100 +20 ADAM 1e− 5 6900 +38.33
STAB+MSE RESNET-50 4×V100 +20 ADAM 1e− 5 7620 +42.33
VISION-APIS/DNCNN SAME AS IMAGENET SAME AS IMAGENET
Note that for STAB training, we find that using ADAMTHENSGD leads to significantly better performance than using only
one of them. For this setting, we basically use ADAM with a learning rate of 1e− 3 for 50 epochs, then use SGD with the
following settings:
1. SGD with learning rate that starts at 1e− 4 and drops by a factor of 10 every 100 epochs.
2. SGD with learning rate that starts at 1e− 3 and drops by a factor of 10 every 100 epochs.
3. SGD with learning rate that starts at 1e− 4 and drops by a factor of 10 every 200 epochs.
4. SGD with learning rate that starts at 1e− 3 and drops by a factor of 10 every 200 epochs.
5. SGD with learning rate that starts at 1e− 2 and drops by a factor of 10 every 200 epochs.
6. SGD with learning rate that starts at 1e− 3 and drops by a factor of 10 every 400 epochs.
Also, note that for STAB+MSE RESNET-110, we sweep over the product of the two sets of optimizers {ADAM, SGD}, and
learning rates {1e− 4, 1e− 5}.
Please refer to our code for further details!
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A.2. Pretrained Classifiers
Our method presented in the paper works on any pretrained classifier. For the sake of demonstrating its effectiveness, we use
standard CIFAR-10 and ImageNet neural network architectures.
On CIFAR-10, we train our own versions of the classifiers found in the following repository https://github.com/
kuangliu/pytorch-cifar, namely, we train:
• ResNet-110 • Wide-ResNet-28-10 • Wide-ResNet-40-10 • VGG-16 • VGG-19 • ResNet-18 • PreActResNet-18
• GoogLeNet • DenseNet-121 • ResNeXt29 2x64d •MobileNet •MobileNet-V2 • SENet-18 • ShuffleNet-V2 • Efficient-
Net-B0.16
We train these classifiers in a standard way with data augmentation (random horizontal flips and random crops). We train
each model for 300 epochs using SGD with an initial learning rate of 0.1 that drops by a factor of 10 each 100 epochs. We
provide these pretrained models and code to train them in the repository accompanying this paper.
On ImageNet, we use PyTorch’s ResNet-18, ResNet-34, and ResNet-50 pretrained ImageNet models from the following
link https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/torchvision/models.html.
A.3. Certification Details
In order to certify our (denoiser, classifier) pairs, we use the CERTIFY randomized smoothing algorithm of Cohen et al.
(2019).
For CERTIFY, unless otherwise specified, we use n = 10, 000, n0 = 100, α = 0.001. Note that in (Cohen et al., 2019),
n = 100, 000, which leads to better certification results. Due to computational constraints, we decrease this by a factor of
10. All our results can be improved by increasing n.
In all the above settings, we report the best models over all the hyperparameters we mentioned.
A.4. Source code
Our code and trained denoisers/classifiers can be found in the the following GitHub repository: https://github.com/
microsoft/blackbox-smoothing. The repository also includes all our training/certification logs, which allows for
easy replication of all our results!
16Note that when we train with STAB or STAB+MSE in the query-access setting in the main paper, we use all these models as
surrogate models, excluding ResNet-110, since this is the pretrained model that we assume we only have query access to.
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B. Detailed Experimental Results
In this part, we show more detailed experimental results of black-box smoothing on ImageNet and CIFAR-10 (More
pretrained classifiers and more noise levels).
B.1. Our Best Certified Accuracies over a Range of `2-Radii
Here we show the best certified accuracy we get at various `2-radii. The results are shown in Table 6, Table 7, Table 8 and
Table 9. Note that in both full-access and query-access settings, we outperform the baseline without denoisers17.
Table 6. Certified top-1 accuracy of ResNet-50 on ImageNet at various `2 radii (Standard accuracy is in parenthesis).
`2 RADIUS (IMAGENET) 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5
WHITE-BOX SMOOTHING (COHEN ET AL., 2019) (%) (70)62 (70)52 (62)45 (62)39 (62)34 (50)29
NO DENOISER (BASELINE) (%) (49)32 (12)4 (12)2 (0)0 (0)0 (0)0
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (QUERY ACCESS) (%) (69)48 (56)31 (56)19 (34)12 (34)7 (30)4
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (FULL ACCESS) (%) (67)50 (60)33 (60)20 (38)14 (38)11 (38)6
Table 7. Certified top-1 accuracy of ResNet-34 on ImageNet at various `2 radii (Standard accuracy is in parenthesis).
`2 RADIUS (IMAGENET) 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5
WHITE-BOX SMOOTHING (COHEN ET AL., 2019) (%) (60)50 (53)44 (53)39 (53)33 (53)28 (42)22
NO DENOISER (BASELINE) (%) (44)26 (5)2 (5)1 (0)0 (0)0 (0)0
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (QUERY ACCESS) (%) (65)47 (53)32 (53)18 (34)12 (34)8 (34)3
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (FULL ACCESS) (%) (64)47 (55)32 (55)19 (35)12 (35)8 (16)4
Table 8. Certified top-1 accuracy of ResNet-18 on ImageNet at various `2 radii (Standard accuracy is in parenthesis).
`2 RADIUS (IMAGENET) 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5
WHITE-BOX SMOOTHING (COHEN ET AL., 2019) (%) (56)47 (48)36 (48)31 (48)26 (35)22 (35)19
NO DENOISER (BASELINE) (%) (37)18 (5)1 (5)1 (0)0 (0)0 (0)0
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (QUERY ACCESS) (%) (60)42 (50)26 (50)14 (28)7 (28)5 (28)3
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (FULL ACCESS) (%) (61)42 (52)29 (52)16 (35)10 (35)6 (35)4
Table 9. Certified accuracy of ResNet-110 on CIFAR-10 at various `2 radii (Standard accuracy is in parenthesis).
`2 RADIUS (CIFAR-10) 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5
WHITE-BOX SMOOTHING (COHEN ET AL., 2019) (%) (77)59 (77)45 (65)31 (65)21 (45)18 (45)13
NO DENOISER (BASELINE) (%) (10)7 (9)3 (9)0 (16)0 (16)0 (16)0
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (QUERY ACCESS) (%) (81)45 (68)20 (21)15 (21)13 (16)11 (16)10
BLACK-BOX SMOOTHING (FULL ACCESS) (%) (72)56 (62)41 (62)28 (44)19 (42)16 (44)13
17Table 6 and Table 9 are the same as Table 1 and Table 2 in the main paper, respectively.
Black-box Smoothing: A Provable Defense for Pretrained Classifiers
B.2. Certifying Full-Access CIFAR-10 Classifiers
Figure 7 shows the complete results for certifying CIFAR-10 pretrained classifiers with full access at various noise
levels σ ∈ {0.12, 0.25, 0.50, 1.00}. We can see that using denoisers trained with stability objective (STAB) can get close
certification results to white-box smoothing. The results for σ = 0.25 are the same as Figure 2a in the main text.
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Figure 7. Results for certifying a ResNet-110 CIFAR-10 classifier with full-access using various methods.
B.3. Certifying Query-Access CIFAR-10 Classifiers
Figure 8 shows the full results for certifying CIFAR-10 pretrained classifiers with query access at various noise levels
σ ∈ {0.12, 0.25, 0.50, 1.00}. Compared the full access setting, there is still a noticeable gap between black-box smoothing
and the white-box smoothing. The results for σ = 0.25 are the same as Figure 2b in the main text. Note that for σ = 0.50,
MSE is better than STAB for small `2-radii, but for this range of radii, one would practically choose models with smaller
noise level, say σ = 0.12, as the certified accuracies of the latter are higher in this range of radii.
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Figure 8. Results for certifying a ResNet-110 CIFAR-10 classifier with query-access using various methods.
Black-box Smoothing: A Provable Defense for Pretrained Classifiers
B.4. Certifying Full-Access ImageNet classifiers
Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the complete results for certifying ImageNet pretrained classifiers with full access
at various noise levels σ ∈ {0.25, 0.50, 1.00}. The results for σ = 0.25 are the same as Figure 3 in the main text. Notice
that STAB+MSE is better than MSE for all cases. It can be seen that with larger noise level σ, the gap between black-box
smoothing and white-box smoothing becomes larger.
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Figure 9. Results for certifying a ResNet-18 ImageNet classifier with full-access.
0.0 0.5 1.0
2 radius
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ce
rti
fie
d 
Ac
cu
ra
cy
White-box
Stab+MSE
MSE
No denoiser
(a) σ = 0.25
0.0 0.5 1.0
2 radius
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ce
rti
fie
d 
Ac
cu
ra
cy
White-box
Stab+MSE
MSE
No denoiser
(b) σ = 0.50
0.0 0.5 1.0
2 radius
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ce
rti
fie
d 
Ac
cu
ra
cy
White-box
Stab+MSE
MSE
No denoiser
(c) σ = 1.00
Figure 10. Results for certifying a ResNet-34 ImageNet classifier with full-access.
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Figure 11. Results for certifying a ResNet-50 ImageNet classifier with full-access.
Black-box Smoothing: A Provable Defense for Pretrained Classifiers
B.5. Certifying Query-Access ImageNet classifiers
Figure 12, Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the full results for certifying ImageNet pretrained classifiers with query access at
various noise levels σ ∈ {0.25, 0.50, 1.00}. The results for σ = 0.25 are the same as Figure 4 in the main text. In general,
STAB+MSE outperforms MSE. Notice that similar to the case of full-access setting, the gap becomes larger between
black-box smoothing and white-box smoothing.
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Figure 12. Results for certifying a ResNet-18 ImageNet classifier with query-access.
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Figure 13. Results for certifying a ResNet-34 ImageNet classifier with query-access.
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Figure 14. Results for certifying a ResNet-50 ImageNet classifier with query-access.
Black-box Smoothing: A Provable Defense for Pretrained Classifiers
C. More Surrogate Models, Better Transfer
Here we demonstrate that when certifying pretrained classifiers with query access, we can get better certification results
if we use more surrogate models when training the denosiers. The comparisons are shown in Figure 15 on CIFAR-10 for
STAB and STAB+MSE. We can see that in the case of STAB, using 14 surrogate models is important to generalize to an
unseen ResNet-110 classifier especially for large σ. The results for σ = 0.25 are the same as Figure 2c in the main text.
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Figure 15. Results for certifying a ResNet-110 CIFAR-10 classifier with query-access using various number of surrogate models with
STAB and STAB+MSE.
Black-box Smoothing: A Provable Defense for Pretrained Classifiers
D. Vision APIs Detailed Results
In this appendix, we present more detailed results of black-box smoothing on the four Vision APIs we consider in this paper.
D.1. Comparison between Stab+MSE and MSE objectives
Figure 16, Figure 17, Figure 18 and Figure 19 show the comparison between the certification results of STAB+MSE and
MSE objectives for various vision APIs, surrogate models (ResNet-18/34/50), and noise levels σ ∈ {0.12, 0.25}. Observe
that the performance of the STAB+MSE objective either roughly matches or outperforms the MSE objective18.
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Figure 16. The certification results of the Azure API using STAB+MSE (across various surrogate models) and MSE denoisers.
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Figure 17. The certification results of the Google Cloud Vision API using STAB+MSE (across various surrogate models) and MSE
denoisers.
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Figure 18. The certification results of the Clarifai API using STAB+MSE (across various surrogate models) and MSE denoisers.
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Figure 19. The certification results of the AWS API using STAB+MSE (across various surrogate models) and MSE denoisers.
18Figure 6 in the main text is generated by plotting, for each API, the best certification curve for STAB+MSE across the three surrogate
models presented here, along with the MSE curve, and for σ = 0.25.
Black-box Smoothing: A Provable Defense for Pretrained Classifiers
D.2. More Monte Carlo Samples, More Robustness
Here we empirically demonstrate that by using more Monte Carlo samples per image in black-box smoothing, we get
better certification bounds. Figure 20 reports the certified accuracies (over 100 samples of the ImageNet validation set),
after applying black-box smoothing to the Azure Vision API, over a range of `2-radii, and with 1000 vs. 100 Monte Carlo
samples. Indeed, we notice that more samples lead to higher certified accuracies (i.e. more robust versions of the Azure
API).
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Figure 20. The certification results, with 1000 vs. 100 Monte Carlo samples per image, of the Azure API with an MSE-denoiser.
Black-box Smoothing: A Provable Defense for Pretrained Classifiers
E. Stability vs Classification Objectives
The stability objective, introduced in subsection 3.3, is similar to another objective, namely the classification objective,
which we will refer to as CLF. For this objective the loss function, previously defined in Equation 5, is now defined as
the cross entropy loss between the output probabilities and the true labels yi’s (as opposed to the pseudo-labels f(xi)’s
generated by the pretrained classifier f ):
LClf = ES,δ `CE(F (Dθ(xi + δ)), yi) (6)
where δ ∼ N (0, σ2I) ,
Note that in the main text, we stick with the stability objective, since, as we show in the following subsections, the
performance of the stability objective is comparable to that of the classification objective (and sometimes slightly better).
Also note that, for training the denoisers with classification objectives, we use the same hyperparameters as the stability
objective shown in Table 5.
E.1. CIFAR-10
Figure 21 compares the performance of denoisers trained with STAB against denoisers trained with CLF on CIFAR-10.
(a) and (b) show the full-access and query-access settings, respectively. Observe that the performance of the classification
objectives is comparable to that of the stability objective.
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Figure 21. Comparison between stability objective and classification objective on a ResNet-110 CIFAR-10 classifier.
E.2. ImageNet
Figure 22 compares MSE-trained denoisers fine-tuned on the stability objective (STAB+MSE) against MSE-trained denoisers
fine-tuned on the classification objective (CLF+MSE) on ImageNet ResNet-18/30/50 in the full-access setting. Again, the
performance of the classification objectives is comparable to that of the stability objective.
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Figure 22. Comparison between stability objective and classification objective on ResNet-18/34/50 ImageNet classifiers.
Black-box Smoothing: A Provable Defense for Pretrained Classifiers
E.3. Vision APIs
Figure 23, Figure 24, Figure 25 and Figure 26 show the performance of fine-tuning using the stability objective (STAB+MSE)
and fine-tuning using the classification objective (CLF+MSE) on four vision APIs, with σ ∈ {0.12, 0.25}. We notice that
STAB+MSE and CLF+MSE have largely the same performance.
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Figure 23. The certification results of the Azure API with denoisers trained with STAB+MSE vs. CLF+MSE.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
2 radius
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ce
rti
fie
d 
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Stab+MSE on ResNet18| = 0.12
Stab+MSE on ResNet18| = 0.25
Clf+MSE on ResNet18| = 0.12
Clf+MSE on ResNet18| = 0.25
(a) ResNet-18
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
2 radius
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ce
rti
fie
d 
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Stab+MSE on ResNet34| = 0.12
Stab+MSE on ResNet34| = 0.25
Clf+MSE on ResNet34| = 0.12
Clf+MSE on ResNet34| = 0.25
(b) ResNet-34
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
2 radius
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ce
rti
fie
d 
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Stab+MSE on ResNet50| = 0.12
Stab+MSE on ResNet50| = 0.25
Clf+MSE on ResNet50| = 0.12
Clf+MSE on ResNet50| = 0.25
(c) ResNet-50
Figure 24. The certification results of the Google API with denoisers trained with STAB+MSE vs. CLF+MSE.
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Figure 25. The certification results of the Clarifai API with denoisers trained with STAB+MSE vs. CLF+MSE.
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Figure 26. The certification results of the AWS API with denoisers trained with STAB+MSE vs. CLF+MSE.
Black-box Smoothing: A Provable Defense for Pretrained Classifiers
F. Denoising Examples on ImageNet
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Figure 27. Performance of the various ImageNet denoisers on noisy images (first row) of standard deviation of 0.12, 0.25, 0.5, and 1.0
respectively from left to right.
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Figure 28. Performance of the various ImageNet denoisers on noisy images (first row) of standard deviation of 0.12, 0.25, 0.5, and 1.0
respectively from left to right.
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Figure 29. Performance of the various ImageNet denoisers on noisy images (first row) of standard deviation of 0.12, 0.25, 0.5, and 1.0
respectively from left to right.
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Figure 30. Performance of the various ImageNet denoisers on noisy images (first row) of standard deviation of 0.12, 0.25, 0.5, and 1.0
respectively from left to right.
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Figure 31. Performance of the various ImageNet denoisers on noisy images (first row) of standard deviation of 0.12, 0.25, 0.5, and 1.0
respectively from left to right.
